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Abstract 
This thesis will engage with the thinking of Martin Heidegger in order to show 
that our environmental problems are the necessary consequences of our 
way of 'knowing' the world . Heidegger questions the abstract, theoretical 
approach that the Western tradition has to 'knowledge', locating 'knowledge' 
in the human 'subject', an interior self, disengaged from and standing over 
against the other-than-human world , as external 'object' . Such an approach 
denies a voice to the other-than-human in the construction of 'knowledge'. 
Heidegger maintains that we are not a disembodied intellect, but rather we 
are finite, self-interpreting beings, embodied in a physical, social and 
historical context, for whom things matter. In view of this, he discards 
traditional notions of 'knowledge', in favour of understanding and 
interpretation. Accordingly, he develops what can be called a dialectical 
ontology, whereby we come to understand and interpret ourselves and other 
beings in terms of our involved interactions. This involved understanding 
acknowledges the participation of other-than-human beings in constructing 
an interpretation of the world, giving them a voice . Following Heidegger's 
way of thinking, I suggest that by developing an ontological-ethic, a way of 
dwelling-in-the-world based on a responsive engagement with other-than-
human entities, we can disclose a world that makes both the other-than-
human and humanity possible. 
The Question Concerning the Environment: A Heideggerian Approach 
to Environmental Philosophy 
Introduction 
This paper is a contribution to environmental philosophy through an 
engagement with the thinking of Martin Heidegger.1 Environmental 
philosophy has arisen in response to what has been termed an 
'environmental crisis '. This term has been coined to encompass the negative 
consequences of human activity on our planet. Although humans, along with 
other beings, unavoidably modify their environment in order to sustain life, 
human actions have contributed to such things as: the destruction of other-
than-human habitats; the extinction of human and other-than-human beings; 
chemical pollution of land, waterways and atmosphere; damage to health 
from the widespread use of biocides; deforestation and the degradation and 
depletion of crop and grazing lands due to intensive agriculture. The results 
of human activity are far reaching and complex and in some cases, as in 
species extinction , irreversible. 
Although we have evidence that there have been climate changes, 
geochemical and biological changes and mass extinctions in the past, 
human activity cannot be classed as a similar fateful event. Human actions 
are based on certain understandings and convictions of ourselves and our 
1 Although my account differs in significant ways from the following thinkers, my interest in 
Heidegger's thinking in relation to environmental philosophy is indebted to their writing : 
Joseph Grange 'On The Way Towards Foundational Ecology' in Soundings, 1977, p. 135-
149; Michael E. Zimmerman, Toward a Heideggerian Ethos for Radical Environmentalism ' 
in Environmental Ethics, 1983, Volume 5, Issue 2, p. 99-131 ; Michael E. Zimmerman , 
'Rethinking the Heidegger-Deep Ecology Relationship , in Environmental Ethics, 1993, 
Volume 15, Issue 3, p.195-224; Bruce V. Foltz, 'On Heidegger and the Interpretation of 
Environmental Crisis' in Environmental Ethics, 1984, Volume 6, Issue 4, p. 326-338. 
Although many interpreters of Heidegger's thought stress the differences between his earlier 
and later writings, I am one who senses an important continuity in his work, and approach 
my account with this in mind. 
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world, which can be subjected to both factual and ethical criticism and 
subsequent transformation. 
Martin Heidegger's insightful thinking reinterprets many of the traditionally 
held assumptions about ourselves and the world. Heidegger was a German 
philosopher, living between the years of 1889-1976. His first major work was 
Being and Time, published in 1927; it is concerned with ontology and 
explores what it means to Be.2 Traditionally, ontology is the inquiry into, or 
theory of being, the question of what there is. However, for Heidegger, 
ontology is concerned with an inquiry into the question of how we come to 
understand what it means 'to Be'. 
Heidegger points out that all philosophical thinking and inquiry is embedded 
in the particular cultural and historical understanding that the inquirer brings 
to the task of thinking. Therefore, there can be no unmediated, apodictic 
'facts' or 'truths' independent of a situated interpretation.3 He claims that 
there can be no 'objective', value-free ground for knowledge and that our 
thinking and inquiry are a disclosive movement shaped and directed by our 
particular social and historical circumstance. The disclosive movement of 
thinking and inquiry begins with being assailed by moods, such as wonder, 
interest and curiosity, which are ways of being attuned in-the-world that 
make it possible to direct ourselves towards something and thus enables us 
2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (trans.), Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell , 1967, H 5-8, p. 24-28 When I refer to 'Being' in Heidegger's sense of the 
word, I will use a capital 'B', although Being is not to be thought of as a noun. Heidegger 
states 'Being is the transcendens pure and simple ', in that it 'lies beyond every entity and 
every possible character which an entity may possess'. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 
H 38, p. 62.The Being of beings (what a thing is understood as), is disclosed (a/ethia) to us 
through a situated, open, responsive engagement with beings, and will be discussed in 
detail below. 
3 Heidegger lays out his phenomenological hermeneutic approach in Martin Heidegger, 
Being and Time, H 27-40, p. 49-64. He acknowledges his own work as interpretation and 
the need for continual self-questioning, as, on any path of thinking, there is always the risk 
of going astray. 
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to question our tactic life.4 Consequently, philosophy can only be an 
interpretation, a thinking that is a conceptual attempt to articulate, clarify and 
remain attentive and responsive to our concrete, lived situation. 
When we inquire into and think about some thing we have a questioning 
comportment. 5 Heidegger holds that "questioning builds a way" and that 
"questions are paths towards an answer". If an answer can be given it is not 
fixed or closed; rather, it consists in a transformation in our thinking.6 To 
travel Heidegger's path of thinking is to call into question the understandings 
and assumptions of our age, that through a specific interpretation of what is, 
form our view of reality. 7 This path of questioning is the task of thinking . It is 
a surrendering of previous thinking and an opening of our human existence 
to other possible modes of thought, in order to surpass the actualities of the 
past and the present and disclose future possibilities from within our present 
context. 
My primary intention in this paper is to employ Heidegger's path of thinking 
to show that, as inheritors of the Western metaphysical tradition , our way of 
thinking has disclosed a world of human - other-than-human relations that 
has resulted in the environmental problems that we encounter today. I 
suggest that our environmental degradation is the result of a dominating and 
controlling relation with the other-than-human realm and that such a relation 
4 Heidegger discusses the disclosive capacity of moods in Martin Heidegger, Being and 
Time, H 134-142, p. 172-182 
5 Heidegger points out that as human beings we are entities whose Being includes the 
possibility of questioning; Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 7, p. 27 
6 Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology' in Basic Writings, from Being 
and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), David Farrell Krell (ed .), New York: 
HarperCollins, 1977, 1993, p. 311 ; Martin Heidegger, 'The End of Philosophy and the Task 
of Thinking ', in Basic Writings, p. 431 ; 437 
7 Martin Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', in 'The Question Concerning Technology 
and Other Essays', William Lovitt (trans.), London: Garland Publishing Inc. , 1977, p. 115-
116 
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is the necessary consequence of our way of 'knowing' ourselves and other 
entities that is implicit in this tradition. Consequently, even with the best of 
intentions, any environmental approach that operates within the assumptions 
embedded in this traditional way of thinking will be unable to attend to our 
environmental problems. 
Heidegger's path of thinking opens up new possibilities for human - other-
than-human relations. I will take up Heidegger's account of authentic human 
existence as an attuned , responsive, engaged openness, through which we 
come to understand and interpret both ourselves and other-than-human 
entities. This involved understanding is a dialectical relation that 
acknowledges the participation of other-than-human beings in constructing 
an interpretation of the world , giving them a voice. I will show that it is a 
respectful relation that constitutes an ontological-ethical way of dwelling-in-
the-world , making both the other-than-human and humanity possible. 
Heidegger maintains that in seeking to explain reality and address the 
question of what there is, the tradition has sought to discover the principles 
that underlie the phenomena of the world . Philosophers have tried to explain 
the 'natural' world in terms of context-free elements, attributes, features or 
primitives, which are constantly present. Such thinking is dominated by 
objectivity, the idea that the world consists of objects that have timeless 
properties, which human beings can come to 'know' through detached 
contemplation . These objects are considered passive, in that they do not 
actively contribute to the sum total of our 'knowledge'. Human beings, as 
subjects, are considered to be those who 'know', producing 'knowledge' 
through their manipulations and representations of the world. This kind of 
'knowledge' results in 'theory', a disembodied way of 'knowing ' the world . 
Thus, human beings are regarded as rational , speaking subjects and the 
ground of all possible 'knowledge', relegating the other-than-human realm to 
silent objects, known only through detached contemplation. Such an 
objectification of other-than-human entities leads to the idea of human 
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superiority and independence and establishes a way of 'knowing' the world 
that is controlling and dominating. 
Heidegger asserts that the tradition has failed to notice that we are not a 
disembodied intellect, but rather we are finite, self-interpreting beings 
embodied in a physical, social and historical context, for whom things 
matter.8 As such it discounts the more primordial way in which we encounter 
the world, through our engaged practical activities. He rejects the notion that 
our concrete lived existence, our practical involvements in the world, should 
be subordinated to abstract knowledge. He maintains that we come to 
understand the world because we are involved with it. In contrast to the 
tradition, Heidegger holds that the meaning of being must be sought in 
human understanding and that 'to Be' means 'to be understood as 
something'. Such understanding is situated and contextual. Consequently, 
as any theoretical abstract search for categories of being cannot provide any 
significance, they contribute to our 'forgetfulness of Being', as Being remains 
hidden or concealed. 9 
As a consequence, he develops what can be called a dialectical ontology, 
seeking to make explicit the structures of everyday human existence, the 
complexities that unite what are traditionally conceived as 'subject' and 
'object', in a dynamic, interactive, on-going process of understanding, in 
order to make sense of how things are, rather than explaining what they are. 
In order to set aside the view of reality we get from abstract theorizing and 
focus instead on the way things show up in our everyday, pre-reflective 
activities, Heidegger creates a vocabulary that seeks to avoid traditional 
philosophical terminology and associations. For example, he uses the word 
'comportment' (verhalten) to refer to our directed activity, the way we 
8 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 266, p. 310 
9 Ibid. , H 219, p. 261-262 
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conduct ourselves or relate ourselves to something, in order to avoid such 
intentionalist language as beliefs and desires. 10 Such comportments are 
attributed not to consciousness, but to Oasein. Oasein is Heidegger's term 
for the human way of being. 11 Oasein is a situated 'being-in-the-world' 
constituted by understanding, that is, the ability to live and cope skillfully 
within a world .12 Fundamental to this understanding is the temporality of the 
care structure of Dasein, whereby Oasein 's Being can never be contained in 
the here and now, but is rather extended over the three temporal dimensions 
of past, present and future at once: through our concerned involvement in-
the-world we project ourselves into an anticipated future based on an 
understanding determined by the past, which we still are in the present. 
Accordingly, human existence is a happening that unfolds from birth towards 
death, in which the past, the present and the future are a unity in defining the 
Being of Dasein. 13 What ontically distinguishes Oasein from other entities is 
that its Being is an issue for it; Dasein always understands itself in terms of 
its existence, that is , in terms of a possibility of itself.14 Accordingly, 
Heidegger maintains that Dasein 's essence is its existence and that an 
essence is not something foundational or fixed , but is rather the way Dasein 
comes to Be, through its engaged , temporal involvements in-the-world.15 
Thus, Oasein is a way of being that embodies an understanding of what it is 
10 Ibid., H 4, p. 23, note 1 
11 Heidegger critiques Descartes interpretation of 'knowing ' in Being and Time, H 89-101 , p. 
122-134. He replaces the Cartesian 'knowing subject' ( cogito) of consciousness by Dase in 
in order to counter the binary distinction of subject-object. Although Dasein is translated in 
many texts as 'Being-there', William Lovitt states that Heidegger has emphatically 
expressed the necessity for 'Oa' to be translated as 'openness' as opposed to 'there'. See 
the translator's introduction by William Lovitt in Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, William Lovitt (trans.), London : Garland Publishing Inc., 
1977, p. xxxv, note 2. 
12 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 12-13, p. 32-33. 
13 Ibid., H 372-375, p. 424-427 
14 Ibid., H 12, p. 32-33; H 143-144, p. 182-184; H 191 -192, p. 236, H 231, p. 274 
15 Ibid., H 42, p. 67-68 
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to Be in a particular context. It is because Dasein's way of being is an 
'openness to Being', attuned and responsively engaged within a world, that it 
is able to disclose entities as something. 16 
As a result, Heidegger's non-reductive dialectical ontology is able to 
dispense with many of the concepts of traditional Western thinking that result 
in an epistemology of domination and control. In contrast to traditional 
objectivity, that sees the human - other-than-human relationship in dualistic 
terms, resulting in our alienation from the other-than-human realm, 
Heidegger maintains that we come to understand both ourselves and others 
through our engaged involvements.17 The act of understanding is a 
continuous act, not of the mind or body, but of a living participant. 
Accordingly, the relation between Dasein and other entities-in-the-world is 
more fundamental than either of the constituents of that relation. This 
relation is dialectical, whereby the other-than-human and the human are 
simultaneously shaping and being shaped by one another. This involved, 
reciprocal understanding is in contrast to traditional models that conceive 
human beings as a 'knowing subject', disengaged from and standing over 
against what is 'known', the other-than-human, as 'object'. Implicit in this 
traditional idea is that 'knowledge' belongs to subjects, not objects. It 
disregards the participation of other-than-human entities in constructing an 
understanding of ourselves and other beings-in-the-world. 
As a consequence, Heidegger questions and reinterprets the traditional 
ideas that we have concerning 'knowledge' and 'truth' .18 Rejecting the idea 
16 Ibid., H 12, p. 32-33 
17 In seeking to overcome the subject-object binary, Heidegger is not denying that there are 
objects independent of Dasein, nor is he denying subjectivity, in the sense of directed 
activity, to Dasein. Heidegger's aim is to show that subject-object ontologies are unable to 
grasp contextual , pre-reflective experience. He shows that the theoretical constructions that 
ground our ideas of ·subjects' and 'objects' are derivative modes of disclosure, constructs 
derived from our pre-reflective experience. 
18 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 213-230, p.256-273 
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of 'truth' as objective, timeless, permanent, universally valid and absolute, he 
reinterprets 'truth' as disclosure (alethia) . 19 When a thing is disclosed to us 
as something, it is a contextual response, consistent with the experiences of 
culturally formed, historically situated beings. Heidegger also shifts the focus 
from 'knowledge' to interpretation; interpretations must be attentive to and 
appropriate to the 'things themselves' .20 An interpretation is based on our 
engaged understandings, that is, our concerns as a being-in-the-world.21 
Fundamental to the notion of truth as disclosure is Heidegger's appropriation 
of the Greek term physis as the precondition for the disclosure of any 
entity.22 The concept of physis circumvents traditional Western historical and 
cultural associations of the term 'nature' and its cognates. Heidegger 
describes physis as a spontaneous self-becoming, which transcends the 
categories that represent it. It is not a finite , knowable, appearing entity; 
rather, it is a presencing whereby entities come out of concealment into 
unconcealment and are disclosed to and through Dasein. This disclosure 
occurs through a responsive engagement, a propriating event (ereignis) , 
constituted by the self-disclosure of entities and a situated Dasein. Through 
this disclosive correlation , a thing becomes intelligible as something, that is, 
19 Ibid. , H 75, p.105 Heidegger uses the term to 'disclose' to signify 'to lay open' and 'the 
character of having been laid open '. This does not imply that we have detailed awareness of 
the contents which are thus disclosed, but rather that they have been 'laid open' to us as 
implicit in what is given, so that they may be made explicit to our awareness by further 
analysis or discrimination of the given, rather than by any inference from it. Seep. 105-106, 
note 1 
20 Ibid. , H 153, p. 195 
21 Ibid., H 152-154, p. 194-195 Heidegger explains how our interpretations are grounded in 
our involved understandings through the structure of fore-having, fore-sight and fore-
conception, that is, respectively, our prior understandings, our perspective of concern and 
the direction that guides the interpretation . 
22 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Ralph Manheim (trans. ), London: Yale 
University Press, 1959 p. 14 
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its 'truth' is made available. 23 Physis provides the boundary that delineates 
the range of possibilities within which things can be disclosed. 
A good deal of environmental thinking has posited a particular idea of 
'nature' that should be saved . For instance, some thinkers have argued that 
we should save 'pristine nature'; others that 'wild nature' or 'wilderness' must 
be preserved; some suggest that 'nature' is a resource that must be 
conserved . All these connotations of 'nature' see it as something that is 
'actual' and separate and apart from humanity. Heidegger's thinking enables 
us to see that what we understand as 'nature' is historically, socially and 
culturally specific and that Western metaphysical thinking has produced a 
particular idea of 'nature' that is alienated from humanity. In contrast, 
Heidegger's conception of physis, understood as the precondition for the 
disclosure of the contextual meaning of any entity, is intimately related to 
humanity: human beings are an openness to Being through which a physis -
being can be meaningfully disclosed. Consequently, there is no one idea of 
nature that needs saving; rather, physis is an integral part of the meaningful 
possibilities inherent in the lives of culturally, socially and historically situated 
beings. 
Thus, central to Heidegger's notion of disclosing meaningful possibilities is 
our ability to be open to physis. This openness is an apprehending (noein, 
to apprehend; nous, apprehension),24 in which we let some thing come to us, 
taking a receptive attitude to that which shows itself. It is an originary 
thinking that is non-objective and attentive: it listens to and responds to 'the 
meaning which reigns in everything that is' .25 By cultivating a way of 
23 Truth understood as disclosure is discussed in Martin Heidegger, 'On the Essence of 
Truth ', in Basic Writings, p. 115-138. 
24 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 137-138 
25 Martin Heidegger, 'Memorial Address', in Discourse on Thinking, John Anderson and F. 
Hans Freund (trans.), New York: Harper & Row, 1966, p. 46 In different texts Heidegger 
refers to this 'responsive engaged openness' in different ways: for example in 'Memorial 
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dwelling, an ethos, in which we are open to Being, originary thinking opens 
the way for a responsive understanding and respectful relation towards 
entities. I will show that it is this respectful relation that can constitute an 
ontological-ethical way of dwelling-in-the-world, making both the other-than-
human and humanity possible. 
Chapter one provides an account of Heidegger's critique of traditional 
Western thinking. Heidegger differentiates between ontical inquiry and 
ontological inquiry. Ontical inquiry is concerned with the beingness of entities 
and has lead to foundationalist approaches to 'knowledge' which embrace a 
subject-object dualism. In contrast, ontology is concerned with an inquiry into 
the question of how we come to understand what it means 'to Be'. 
Heidegger's critique seeks to dissolve the subject-object binary and 
undermine foundationalist claims that result in a way of 'knowing' the world 
that is dominating and controlling, the consequence of which is a destructive 
relation with other-than-human entities. 
Chapter two discusses Heidegger's appropriation of the term physis, which 
avoids the traditional Western terminology and associations of 'nature' and 
the 'natural' and serves to challenge the traditional idea that 'nature' can be 
'known' in any concrete sense. Rather, a situated, responsive engagement 
with physis discloses entities as contextually meaningful. 
Chapter three continues the discussion of responsive engagement, showing 
that it is through being open and responsively engaged that a world is 
disclosed. Heidegger suggests that Dasein, as a being-in-the-world, can 
dwell in-the-world either authentically or inauthentically. An inauthentic 
existence remains absorbed within the world of common concerns and 
Address' he uses the phrase 'meditative thinking'; in An Introduction to Metaphysics it is 
referred to as 'apprehension'; in 'Letter on Humanism' it is referred to as 'thinking'. Thus, for 
the sake of consistency and clarity, throughout my work I will refer to the 'responsive, 
engaged openness' of apprehension as originary thinking. 
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practices of the particular social, cultural and historical age that it has 'fallen' 
into. As such, it takes its world as the world, an unchanging constant 
presence. Although Dasein is always situated in a particular social and 
historical context, an authentic dwelling recognizes that these are not fixed 
conditions. In authenticity Dasein is open to the situatedness of its existence, 
recognizing the extent to which a view of the world is always limited and 
incomplete. In authenticity Dasein is opened to its existence-as-possibility 
and is thus open to the possibility of understanding the world in a new way. 
Chapter four upholds the primacy of our shared everyday concerns and 
emphasises our involvement with other-than-human entities in developing an 
understanding of our world. To this end, I provide an account of the thoughts 
of Martin Heidegger and also present an outline of the ecological psychology 
of James J. Gibson, which supports Heidegger's thinking.26 Both thinkers 
challenge the detached theoretical stance that has dominated traditional 
Western conceptions of ourselves and the world. Heidegger and Gibson 
both recognize the dialectical nature of the encounters between ourselves, 
as embodied beings and other entities, in creating an understanding of a 
world. Understanding is not a cognitive phenomenon; it is an attuned, 
involved awareness and an action-guiding accomplishment. 27 Human 
understanding is consistent with the concerns of finite, self-interpreting 
beings, embodied in a physical , social and historical context, for whom 
things matter. 
By separating subject from object, traditional objectivism helps to constitute 
the belief that we can act upon our environment without ourselves being 
acted upon. If we accept that our understanding of ourselves and other 
entities is a dialectical relationship, gained from our embodied interactions, 
26 James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, London: Lawrence 
Erlbaum, 1986. 
27 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 142-143 p. 182-183 
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then we must also accept that our actions towards other entities impact upon 
ourselves. 
Chapter five lays out Heidegger's critique of the essence of technology, 
which he holds is an enframing ( Geste//), a totalising way in which all entities 
are disclosed. This form of disclosure has become the dominant way of 
disclosing the world in our present age, concealing all other possible ways of 
disclosure. It is a total objectifying of the world that, through a calculative 
thinking, categorizes and assimilates beings to human order and purpose 
and perpetuates our dominating and controlling relation with other entities. 
As such, Heidegger maintains that it is the culmination of metaphysics.28 
Chapter six shows that it is through originary thinking that Dasein is able to 
recover a meaningful world. World, as an open realm of possibilities, is the 
way that Oasein and other entities exist authentically. Through originary 
thinking, Oasein lets other beings Be, in the sense of allowing them to 
manifest themselves in terms of their own inherent possibilities. Heidegger 
maintains that it is through the comportment of Gelassenheit, a way of being 
attuned-in-the-world that provides Dasein with clear vision, that Dasein is 
released from the attachments of the familiar world.29 Together, originary 
thinking and Gelassenheit enable a respectful and caring relation with other 
entities. They make possible an ethos, a way of living that is open to Being 
and thus protects and sustains a richer understanding of the world. I 
maintain that it is only through an authentic existence that we can respond to 
and address our environmental concerns. 
28 When employing the term metaphysics, Heidegger is referring to traditional Western 
thinking that has been concerned with the beingness of beings, understood as a constant 
presence (discussed in chapter one), in contrast to the meaning of Being. Hence, for 
Heidegger, the essence of technology is the 'completion of metaphysics', as it discloses a// 
entities as a constant presence. See Martin Heidegger, 'The End of Philosophy', Joan 
Stambaugh (trans.), London: Souvenir Press, p. 92-93 
29 Martin Heidegger, 'Memorial Address', in Discourse on Thinking, p. 54 
12 
Chapter seven outlines Heidegger's condemnation of traditional ethical 
theorizing. By offering norms, rules and measures for right behaviour, 
traditional ethical theorizing has been concerned with morals , the subjective 
calculus of what is good and what is bad . It has left unthought Dasein 's 
fundamental ethos; it has failed to think Being as the essential dwelling place 
of human existence.30 Although Heidegger does not develop an ethic, I will 
show that his thinking allows the emergence of an ontological-ethic. I will 
maintain that an ontological-ethic that is informed by the boundaries of 
physis is able to guide actions and modes of living. An ontological-ethic 
suggests that in order for Dasein to live well it must be able to inhabit its 
environment in a way that enables it to pursue its existence-as-possibility, 
which requires the existence of other-than-human entities. 
Chapter eight discusses the practical implications of an ontological-ethic and 
suggests ways in which an ontological-ethic can be implemented . 
30 Martin Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism' in Basic Writings, p. 258 
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1 
Heidegger's Critique of Traditional Western Thinking 
Heidegger's critique of the traditional Western approach to explaining the 
'natural' world seeks to undermine the foundationalist approach to 
'knowledge' and to dissolve the subject-object binary that sets up this 
foundationalist 'knowing' relation. Hence, he engages in a 'destruction' of the 
metaphysical tradition, in order to disclose the finite and temporal character 
of Being. His critique of traditional metaphysics is not meant as a 
disparaging criticism of historical thinking, or a denial of tradition. Rather, its 
aim is positive: it is an "un-building (de-struere) of the layers covering up the 
original nature of Being, the layers which metaphysical thinking has con-
structed", in order to retrieve the possibilities inherent in that tradition. 31 
Beginning with the thoughts of Thales, in the sixth century B.C.E., Western 
thinking has been preoccupied with the composition of reality; what underlies 
all the changes of the 'natural' world . In seeking to answer this question, the 
Western tradition has taken a path that has sought to explain the world in 
terms of context-free elements, attributes, features or primitives, which are 
constantly present. Constant presence does not refer to duration, but rather 
to presencing; the tradition has sought to explain what is by way of some 
thing unchanging and thereby, constantly present. This focus on enduring 
presence is found in "Plato's Forms, Aristotle's primary substances, the 
Creator of Christian belief, Descartes' res extensa and res cogitans, Kant's 
noumena and the physical stuff presupposed by scientific naturalism".32 
Scientific and philosophical theories have sought to show that the 'natural' 
world consists of an aggregate of objects explainable by abstract properties, 
31 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, p. ix; Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 22-
23, p. 44 
32 Charles B. Guignon, The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Charles B. Guignon (ed .), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 4; Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 
21-22, p. 42-44 
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physical laws and causal relations. Such conceptual schemes are the results 
of disengaged reflective activities and have led to subjective epistemologies. 
Heidegger maintains that the tradition's orientation answers the question of 
being, of what things are, as constant presence for the guarantee of 
representation. It has meant that "being, thought as object, is questioned 
with regard to objectivity and what makes objectivity possible".33 
Consequently, what began as ontology, the question of what there is, has 
become epistemology, the question about knowability, based on the idea of 
truth as the certainty of guaranteed representation. 34 
Subjectivist epistemologies claim we come to 'know' the 'natural ' world , as 
an 'object' , through the disengaged reflection of a 'subject'. The essential 
properties that form the foundations of the 'natural ' world are to be verified 
and 'known' through correct reasoning, a cognitive property of the human 
mind. Accordingly, human beings are regarded as rational , speaking 
subjects and the ground of all possible 'knowledge', relegating the other-
than-human world to silent objects, known only through detached 
contemplation. Such an objectification of 'nature' leads to the idea of human 
superiority and independence and establishes a way of 'knowing ' the world 
that is controlling and dominating. 
In our present age, the reality within which we conduct our lives is 
determined by Western science; modern science is the theory of the real.35 
Although the essence of modern science is grounded in the thinking of the 
pre-Socratic Greeks, Heidegger maintains that there is a distinctive 
character to the 'knowing' of the modern age that differs fundamentally from 
the episteme of the pre-Socratics. The 'theory' that modern science shows 
33 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, p. 88 
34 Ibid. 
35 Martin Heidegger, 'Science and Reflection ', in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, p. 157 
15 
itself to be is something essentially different from the Greek theoria. 36 
Heidegger points out that in Early Greek thinking theoria meant ''the 
beholding that watches over truth ". 37 This essence of theoria is lost when it is 
translated into Latin and becomes contemplatio, which means "a looking-at 
that compartmentalizes". 38 As such , theory became a frame through which 
we come to view reality. And this reality eventually becomes secured as a 
certainty in the realm of abstract ideas and the thinking of mathematics, 
which establish in advance how 'reality' is to be determined.39 Thus, "the 
translation, which issues from the spirit of the Roman language, that is, from 
Roman existence, makes that which is essential in what the Greek words 
say vanish at a stroke".40 In arriving at theory from theoria we have erred 
from the path of truth. Accordingly, Heidegger maintains there is a need to 
recover what has been concealed by this particular modern scientific 
interpretation of what is. 
Heidegger points out that in addressing the question of 'what there is', the 
Western tradition has created a distinction between essence and existence, 
between what-ness, essentia or quidditas and that-ness, existentia. With this 
distinction it is essence that takes priority, leading to an emphasis on beings. 
Its questions focused on the essentia, on entities and the facts about them, 
36 Ibid., p. 157; 166 
37 Ibid., p. 165 
38 Ibid., p. 166 
39 Martin Heidegger, 'Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics', in Basic Writings, 
p.271-305 
40 Martin Heidegger, 'Science and Reflection ', in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, p.165 By emphasizing a visual approach to 'knowledge' contained in the 
modern notion of 'theory', the world is presented as a world of surfaces to be inspected, 
turning it in to a passive object that human beings can come to 'know'. Heidegger rejects 
such a visual approach for a sound orientated approach that comes to understand a world 
by listening to and responding to Being. As such, understanding is a responsive, interactive 
process. This will be discussed below. 
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whereas the existentia of Being remained unquestioned. 41 Heidegger calls 
this focus on the properties and structures of beings ontical inquiry; it is the 
'beingness' of entities.42 Ontical inquiry focuses on substances and their 
essential properties, in order to ascertain that which 'stands-under' (sub-
stantia) and remains continuously present (unchanging) throughout change. 
Ontical inquiry answers the question of being by differentiating the thinking 
subject from the object of thought: "It began when eon, the being of the 
essent, was represented as idea and as such, became the object of 
episteme". 43 Thus, thinking about things became distinct from the things 
thought about. The search for 'knowledge' and 'truth' became a matter of a 
disengaged, rational 'subject' constructing a theory, or framework, that 
discloses the world as a set of 'objects', shaped by the framework that 
makes them what they are. 
This turn to abstraction exemplifies the methods of traditional Western 
philosophy and 'natural' science. Heidegger suggests that if we conceive the 
other-than-human world as an 'object' , as something that is only 'known' 
through the methods of science and metaphysics, it will be radically 
misunderstood .44 Heidegger shows that science explicitly pursues 'nature' as 
41 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, p. 1-4 Heidegger points out that the division 
into what-ness and that-ness is an event in the history of Being; it is the oblivion of Being. 
42 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 11 p. 31 , note 3 
43 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 116-117; 121 
44 Heidegger uses the term 'science' to mean any discipline or branch of knowledge which 
re-presents the world in a particular ontic way. He does not dismiss scientific and traditional 
philosophical thinking ; rather, he aims to show that they are derivative modes of disclosure, 
made possible by the meaningful , pre-reflective practice of our practical involvements in-the-
world , which will be discussed in chapter four. He notes that theoretical structures can be 
disclosive in their own way, but their hegemonic status conceals other meaningful ways in 
which Oasein 's world can be disclosed. 
Modern physics acknowledges a connection of subject and object in scientific investigation. 
Heisenberg states: 'Science no longer confronts 'nature' as an objective observer, but sees 
itself as an actor in the interplay between man and 'nature' .. . method and object can no 
longer be separated '; Werner Heisenberg, The Physicist's Conception of Nature, Arnold J. 
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something to be observed and made meaningful, what he calls being 
'present-at-hand' (Vorhandenheit): "Entities are grasped in their Being as 
presence; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite 
mode of time - the 'Present'". 45 Thus, "that which is present is regarded as 
what is".46 Heidegger maintains that such thinking is concerned with 'correct' 
but not truthful ideas and he considers it to be a 'calculative' kind of 
thinking.47 Calculative thinking, which is our predominant mode of thinking in 
our present age, is means/ends orientated, objectifying, categorizing and 
assimilating beings to human order and purpose. It is concerned with 
regulation, planning, prediction, efficiency and control.48 He maintains that 
when thinking is reduced to calculation directed towards the manipulation of 
'objects' we debase thinking and as a consequence our humanity, our 
potentiality, is threatened. Calculative thinking serves to cover up other ways 
Pomerans (trans.), Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1958, p. 29. However, Heidegger's 
criticism of science is not only focused on dissolving the subjecVobject dualism, but on 
establishing an authentic relation with other beings. He argues that an authentic relation can 
not be grasped through scientific or technological thinking, as they are concerned with 
calculative thinking . An authentic relation lets beings Be; it requires originary thinking . 
Calculative and originary thinking will be discussed below. 
45 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 25, p. 47. In trying to determine the being of beings, 
i.e., what is the condition of being real , traditional Western thinking is dominated by an 
unexamined metaphysics of presence. Heidegger explicitly confronts the question of being 
in relation to time. He identifies a tension contained in the representational idea of time: that 
everything temporal is transitory and that which is most real is thought of as an enduring 
presence. Whilst metaphysics, in thinking of time as that which constantly passes, rules out 
the possibility of eternity, it also tacitly appeals to eternity, as the concept of eternity is 
implicated in the model of the 'now', that is, in reality as constant, unchanging presence. For 
a more detailed account of metaphysical presence see Tina Chanter, 'Metaphysical 
Presence: Heidegger on Time and Eternity' in Arleen B. Dallery & Charles E. Scott (eds.), 
Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought, Albany N.Y. : State 
University of New York Press, 1992, p. 125-138 
46 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking? Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, (trans), 
London : Harper & Row, 1968 p. 92 
47 Heidegger contrasts calculative thinking , which results in 'correct' ideas, with originary 
thinking, which discloses truth. Truth as disclosure will be discussed in chapter two. 
48 Martin Heidegger, 'What calls for Thinking', in Basic Writings, p. 369-391 Calculative 
thinking seems to be in accord with Adorno and Horkheimer's idea of 'instrumental 
rationality', which they see as a mode of reasoning that originally developed because 
humans wanted to work out the best way to control and dominate 'nature'. See Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming. London: 
Verso, 1997, p. 37 
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of understanding the 'natural' world, which is achieved through a more 
primordial mode of thinking , originary thinking. Originary thinking is open to 
disclosing and thus understanding entities in all their possibilities.49 
As a form of calculative thinking, science is always an explanation; it is a 
theoretical projection that abstracts that which is studied from the everyday 
world of meaningful experience. By placing other-than-human entities into a 
conceptual theoretical framework, science makes it an object of 
investigation, decontextualized into meaningless elements, revealed as 
present-at-hand ( Vorhandenheit). It establishes one particular, defined way 
through which 'nature' can be 'known'. An excerpt from Charles Dickens 
novel 'Hard Times ', where the teacher, Mr. Gradgrind, is exalting scientific 
'knowledge', provides a pertinent example: 
"Girl number twenty unable to define a horse!" said Mr. Gradgrind .. . 
"Some boy's definition of a horse". "Bitzer", said Thomas Gradgrind, 
"Your definition of a horse". 
"Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty four grinders, 
four eye-teeth , and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring ; in 
marshy countries sheds hoofs too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be 
shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth". 
"Now girl number twenty, " said Mr. Gradgrind , "You know what a 
horse is".50 
In this instance, a certain idea of a 'horse' is re-presented; it is contained 
within a framework that science has established in advance and which 
shapes our view of things. The idea of the horse is determined by 
490riginary thinking will be discussed in chapter three and chapter six. However, it is 
important to note that Heidegger's aim is not to replace one mode of thinking with another, 
but instead to move from the hegemony of calculative thinking to a balance between 
calculative and originary thinking. 
5
° Charles Dickens, Hard Times, London Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 5 
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permanently present characteristics, whilst the horse itself, its many 
contextual meanings, remains concealed. This may result in a 'correct' 
representation, but what is correct is not yet true. 51 'Correctness' is a limited 
form of truth ; an inadequate truth, grounded upon the framework that makes 
it what it is. But it remains blind to the essence of truth because it conceals 
existential meaning. As a consequence, our experienced reality is 
supplanted by an abstract model of 'reality', which, for all its usefulness, 
cannot claim epistemological or ontological priority over the world as it is 
lived . 
In this way, science, as a rationale or explanation , abstracts from context 
and objectifies the other-than-human realm; other-than-human entities are 
'known' as a constant presence (Vorhandenheit). Heidegger insists that a 
theoretical interpretation does not make the lived world intelligible.52 Thus, 
when we try to comprehend the physicist's small-nesses, the astronomer's 
distances and the mathematician's varieties of infinitude, we lose functional , 
meaningful contact wi th the world .53 
By maintaining that any genuine access to 'nature' is through theory , the way 
to get a grasp of these entities has been decided in advance: through a 
'beholding ' of the mind .54 Thus , by a representing of 'nature' as an object, 
something 'already-known', human beings become subiectum, 'subject', the 
"being upon which all that is, is grounded, as regards the manner of its Being 
51 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 188- 193; Martin Heidegger, 'The 
Question Concerning Technology' in Basic Writings, p. 313 
52 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , H 65, p. 93-94 
53 Daniel McKinley makes this point; see The New Mythology of Man in nature', in The 
Subversive Science: Essays Towards An Ecology Of Man, Paul Shepard and Daniel 
McKinley (eds.), New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969, p.361 
54 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time , H 95, p. 128 
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and its truth". 55 By separating human beings as those that 'know', a 
disengaged, rational mind, from the physical world as a set of objective 
conditions, there began the development of subjective epistemologies. 
Subjective epistemologies take human beings, as 'subject' , to be the source 
of all knowledge and construe 'nature' as a silent 'object', that which can be 
'known', through theoretical explanation. They disregard other beings as 
subjects of significance, denying them a voice in the production of 
'knowledge'. Through such subjective epistemologies the world is conceived 
and grasped as 'picture' (Bild), a "structured image that is the creature of 
human producing, which represents and sets before".56 Heidegger maintains 
that "humanism first arises when the world becomes picture". 57 
The interpretation of human beings as 'subject' and 'nature' as 'object' 
creates a separation and alienation of human beings from the 'natural ' world. 
Together with the method of science as the preeminent way of explaining the 
world, they constitute a way of knowing the world that is dominating and 
controlling. Thus, the path to environmental disharmony and planetary 
imperialism is laid. This alienating stance has led to the idea that we can act 
upon the world without ourselves being acted upon. It implies that we can 
poison our rivers, use chemicals on the land to increase food production, 
administer biocides to kill 'unwanted' living organisms, drain wetlands and 
pollute the atmosphere, without affecting ourselves in the process. 
55 Martin Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture', in The Question Concerning 
Technology, p. 128; 'Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics', in Basic Writings, p. 
304 
56 Martin Heidegger, 'The Age of the World Picture' , in The Question Concerning 
Technology, p. 134 
57 Ibid., p. 133. Paul Shepard also notes and discusses how the multisensuousness, 
especially the auditory quality, of the Early Greek world was lost when the visual sense of 
the detached observer became dominant, and the world becomes picture; see Paul 
Shepard, 'Five Green Thoughts', in 'Encounters with Nature: Essays by Paul Shepard ', 
Florence R. Shepard (ed.), Washington D.C., Island Press, 1999, p. 117-134 
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By upholding a distinction between ontical inquiry and ontological inquiry, 
Heidegger separates the inquiry into the beingness of entities (ontical 
inquiry), from an inquiry into the question of how we come to understand 
what it means 'to Be' (ontological inquiry).58 For Heidegger, 'to Be' means 
'to be understood as something'. He maintains that any theoretical, abstract 
search for categories of being, that prioritize essence over existence and 
emphasize beingness rather than Being, cannot provide any existential 
significance. Hence, they contribute to our forgetfulness of Being.59 
Heidegger states: 
Men have always to do with being in that they are always dealing with 
essents; it is alien to them in that they turn away from being, because 
they do not grasp it but suppose that essents are only essents and 
nothing more. They are awake (in relation to the essent) and yet 
Being is hidden from them.60 
When the other-than-human world is objectified and 'known' through 
methods of abstraction that frame that 'knowledge', it is no longer seen as a 
locus of meaning and value. Meaning and value are seen as a purely 
human, subjective matter and become something 'added on' to a subjective 
experience. Thus, ontic clarity is attained at the expense of truth , in that an 
explanation of 'reality' is given, but it has been completely cleared of 
ontological meaning. 
Consequently, the foundationalist approach of the Western philosophical 
tradition overlooks or conceals our meaningful involvements in-the-world. It 
disregards our situated , social, cultural and historically specific context 
58 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 8-15, p. 28-35 
59 Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, p. 3-4 
60 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 130 
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through which we interact with the other-than-human world and disclose 
meaning. However, Heidegger maintains that being a 'subject' is not the sole 
possibility belonging to the essence of historical humanity. It is not an 
absolute; it belongs to a particular epoch of thinking. Heidegger states that 
what Descartes "left undetermined (when he began with the cogito 
sum) ... was the kind of Being of the res cogitans, or - more precisely - the 
meaning of the Being of the 'sum"'.61 Heidegger's ontology calls into 
question the Cartesian cogito, humanity as a thinking, representing 'subject' 
and provides an account of human existence as Dasein, a being who 
apprehends. As a corollary, he is able to show that 'nature' can no longer be 
conceived as an 'object', a constant presence; rather, it is a presencing. The 
concept of 'nature' is dismantled to retrieve the originary phenomena of 
'nature' as physis, which the Western tradition has covered over.62 
Heidegger maintains that through an open, responsive engagement with 
physis, the Being of beings is disclosed to Dasein. And Being is the reality in 
which we conduct ourselves. 
61 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, H 24, p. 46 
62 Heidegger points out that the Greek word physis was translated into Latin as natura, 
which properly means 'to be born' or 'birth', and through which we derive our word 'nature'. 
However, through this act of translation, the original meaning and philosophical force of the 
term physis is destroyed. See Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 13 
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